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The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Religious
Symbol and Substance
David L. Gregory*& Charles J. Russo**

I. INTRODUCTION

During the closing weeks of the 1994-1995 Term, the United States
Supreme Court issued Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia' and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board

v. Pinette,2 two decisions that further obfuscated the parameters of

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A. 1973, The Catholic
University of America; M.B.A. 1977, Wayne State University; J.D. 1980, University of
Detroit; L.L.M. 1982, Yale University; J.S.D. 1987, Yale University. Patrick R.
Scully, and William T. Leder and Marie Zweig, St. John's University School of Law
Classes of 1996 and 1997, respectively, provided excellent research assistance. St.
John's University School of Law provided a faculty research summer grant.
* * Professor and Chair, Department of Educational Administration, University of
Dayton, School of Education. B.A. 1972, St. John's University; M. Div. 1978,
Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; J.D. 1983, St. John's University; Ed. D. 1989,
St. John's University.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) [hereinafter Rosenberger 111]. For representative
commentary on Rosenberger III, see Larry Cata Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old
Rugged Cross and the State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment
Clause Cases and the Persistence of Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence, 31 TULSA L.J.
447 (1996); Howard Wade Bycroft, Ready-Aim-Fire?-The Supreme Court Continues
Its Assault on the Wall of Separation in Rosenberger, 31 TULSA L.J. 533 (1996);
Jennifer Lynn Davis, The Serpentine Wall of Separation Between Church and State:
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1225
(1996); Paul L. Hicks, The Wall Crumbles: A Look at the Establishment Clause:
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 363
(1995); Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission
Slip for Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535 (1995); Charles Roth,
Note, Rosenberger v. Rector: The First Amendment Dog Chases its Tail, 21 J.C. & U.L.
723 (1995); Robert L. Waring, Note, Talk is Not Cheap: Funded Student Speech at
Public Universities on Trial, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 541 (1995).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). For representative commentary on Capitol Square III, see
Backer, supra note 1; Brant W. Biship, Protecting Private Religious Speech in the
Public Forum: Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 602 (1996); Bernard James & Joanne Kuhns,
Establishment Clause Yields to Free Speech, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at CI0; John E.
Joiner, Note, A Page of History or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 507 (1996); Gregory
A. Napolitano, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Establishment ClauseSymbolic Expression, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1209 (1996); Leading Cases, Viewpoint
Discrimination-Funding for Religious Publication, 109 HARV. L. REV. 210 (1995).

419

420

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

both free exercise and establishment of religion.3 In these opinions,
3. In 1996, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the one Establishment Clause case
before it. City of Edmond v. Robinson, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1702 (1996). In 1965, the city of Edmond adopted an official seal (designed
by a local resident) with four separate quadrants, each having its own design. Robinson,
68 F.3d at 1228. One quadrant depicted a steam engine and oil derrick, another depicted
the Old North Tower, and a third depicted a covered wagon. Id. Each had historical
significance. Id. The fourth quadrant depicted a Christian cross. Id. Since 1965, the
seal appeared throughout the city, and it was on city limits signs, city flags, police and
firefighter uniforms, city vehicles, stickers identifying city property, and in the City
Council chambers. Id.
Plaintiffs, non-Christians, lived or worked in the city of Edmond. Id. They claimed
that the inclusion of the Christian cross violated the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. The district court held that the plaintiffs
remained free to exercise their respective religions, and held for the defendants (the city
and the mayor) because the seal did not violate the Establishment Clause under the threepart "Lemon test." Id.
On plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of their Establishment Clause claim, the Tenth
Circuit also applied the Lemon test. Id. Under the Lemon test, government action
violates the Establishment Clause if it fails any of the following conditions: (1) it must
have a secular purpose; (2) "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion;" and (3) it "must not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
At issue was whether part two of the Lemon test was violated because the seal conveyed
or attempted to convey a message that a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.
Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1229. In determining the "effect," the Tenth Circuit looked at the
particular physical setting, and used an objective standard that looked to-the reaction of
the average receiver of a government communication, or the perception of an average
observer when viewing the action of the city. Id. at 1229-30.
The Tenth Circuit also looked to other circuit court cases addressing the issue of a
government seal containing a religious symbol. Id. at 1230. In Friedman v. Board of
County Commissioners, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986), the court considered the "seal's composition and use" in finding a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782. There, the cross was
prominent in the seal, and the court found that the seal "pervades the daily lives of ...
residents." Id. The seal was on county vehicles, stationery, and the sheriff's uniform.
Id.
Other circuits have similarly dealt with this issue. In the companion cases of Kuhn and
Harris, for example, the Seventh Circuit ruled the same as the Tenth. Circuit. Kuhn v.
City of Rolling Meadows, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); Harris v. City of Zion, 927
F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991). In Kuhn, one quadrant of the seal of the city of Rolling
Meadows contained a depiction of a church under construction with a cross in front.
Kuhn, 927 F.2d at 1403. The seal was used extensively throughout the city, on
letterhead, uniform shoulder patches, and city vehicles. Id. The Seventh Circuit found
that the seal was a permanent statement viewed year-round and rejected the city's
argument that the presence of other secular images on the seal "neutralized" any
religious message. Id. at 1412. The court found such images an endorsement of
Christianity and a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1413. Similarly, in
Harris, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a seal with a religious symbol
merely commemorated the historical origins of the city and held that "the City may not
honor its history" by retaining a blatantly sectarian seal. Harris, 927 F.2d at 1414-15.
Because the Tenth Circuit found no meaningful distinction between the seal of the city
of Edmond and the seals at issue in Friedman,Kuhn and Harris, it found the seal a
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the Court again failed to articulate clear guidelines for the many aspects
of religious activity in the public arena. The decisions present the
nation with the very difficult-perhaps impossible-task of effectively
balancing potentially conflicting constitutional principles. 4 More
specifically, the cases raise the trying question of to what extent, if
any, the government can regulate religious speech without violating the
First Amendment Free Exercise and/or Establishment Clauses by
aiding, advancing, or suppressing a particular religious perspective.5
violation of the Establishment Clause. Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1232-33. In the Edmond
seal, the cross was prominent, the religious meaning or significance was clear, and the
use of the seal was pervasive throughout the city. Id. at 1232. As in Harris, the Tenth
Circuit held that the city may not honor its heritage with a "blatantly sectarian" seal. Id.
In response to the city's argument that the majority of the people in Edmond do not view
the seal as endorsing religion, the court stated that the comfort of the majority is not the
main concern of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1232-33. The city also argued that the other
depictions in the seal (the Tower, steam engine, derrick, and covered wagon) neutralized
any religious message of the cross. Id. at 1233. In response, the court declined to hold
that some clearly defined religious images are permissible in some seals and not others,
depending on their size or the number of other, secular depictions in the seal. Id.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit was denied. 116 S. Ct. 1702 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, dissented. Id.
4. Jurisprudential literature on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment (the "Religion Clauses") continues to proliferate. Some astute scholars
have questioned why anyone should continue any involvement in the infinite
metaphysical parsing of the Religion Clauses as a meaningless exercise. See, e.g.,
STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM at v (1995) (noting that "a better title for the book, my colleague
Paul Campos suggested, would be 'Honey, I Blew Up the First Amendment!"').
Other recent First Amendment religion clause literature has included: WILLIAM J.
MURRAY, LET US PRAY: A PLEA FOR PRAYER IN OUR SCHOOLS (1995); MICHAEL J. PERRY,
LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991);
THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL CELEBRATION AND REAFFIRMATION
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES (1988).

Of course, a classic source for First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence includes,
for example, JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS U 1, 8 (1785). See also WILLIAM BENTLEY BALL, MERE CREATURES OF THE
STATE? EDUCATION, RELIGION AND THE COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE COURTROOM (1994);
JESSIE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH
AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (1995); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); LEONARD LEVY, THE

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 246 (1994) (noting that "[b]ecause the domains of religion and
government remain separated, religion in the United States, like religious liberty,
thrives mightily").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
For recent Establishment clause and Free Exercise clause analyses, see Paul Earl
Pongrace III, Justice Kennedy and the Establishment Clause: The Supreme Court Tries
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RosenbergerIII involved the First Amendment right of free exercise
of religion and speech/press rights of students at the University of
Virginia who wished to recoup, from a student activities fund, the cost
of publishing a campus magazine with a religious editorial
perspective. 6 Reversing the rulings of both the federal district court
and the Fourth Circuit, and holding in favor of the students, the
Supreme Court substantially liberalized the First Amendment freedoms
of speech, press, and free exercise of religion of students at public
colleges and universities, permitting them to express their views
through public university-sponsored newspapers, pamphlets, and
magazines.7

Among the significant jurisprudential questions related to
RosenbergerIII is whether, consistent with the legal developments that
originated in Widmar v. Vincent,8 the constitutional rights of public
the Coercion Test, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 217 (1994); Jay Alan Sekulow et al.,
Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle in
Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351 (1995); Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational
Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837 (1995); Karen T.
White, The Court-Created Conflict of the FirstAmendment: Marginalizing Religion and
Undermining the Law, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (1994); Bila, supra note 1; Marc
Falconetti, Comment, Constitutional Law: Does the Establishment Clause Prohibit
Sending Public Employees into Religious Schools? 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277
(1994). See also Kristin M. Engstrom, Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The
Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 PAC. L.J. 121 (1995); Jason C.
Kravitz, Repelling a Constitutional Battering Ram: The Fight to Keep Nonstudent
Religious Worship Services Out of Public Schools, 19 VT. L. REV. 643 (1995).
6. Rosenberger III, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). See infra Part 1I.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court ruled that a public university could not
constitutionally deny students access to university buildings for voluntary religious
programs. Id. at 276. For commentary on Widmar, see Deborah Brown, The States, the
Schools and the Bible: The Equal Access Act and the State ConstitutionalLaw, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1021 (1993); Debra Gail Minker, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-State University's Policy of Equal Access to Campus Facilities For All
Organizations Including Those of a Religious Character Does Not Violate the
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 32 EMORY L.J. 319 (1983);
Arval A. Morris, The Equal Access Act After Mergens, 61 EDuc. L. REP. 1139 (1990);
Rosemary C. Salomone, From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding Road of First
Amendment Analysis, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1991); Waring, supra note 1.
The developments in Widmar were refined by the Equal Access Act. 20 U.S.C. §§
4071-4074 (1988). The Act permits student-initiated religious groups to meet in certain
public schools during non-instructional time on the same basis as any other student
organized noncurricular groups. Id. § 4071(c).
In addition, two recent cases have extended the scope of the Equal Access Act. See Hsu
v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the
constitution of an after-school Christian Bible study club, with membership open to all
students, could require the club's president, vice president and music minister, but not
the club's secretary and activities coordinator, to be "professed Christians" since their
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elementary and secondary school students may have been analogously
extended. At the same time, it is important to appreciate the practical
ramifications of Rosenberger III in the political and cultural contexts
outside of the public university setting. 9
Meanwhile, in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette,'° the Court affirmed the First Amendment right of that most
pernicious of racist groups, the Ku Klux Klan, to erect a
conspicuously displayed cross on public property." This added to the
consternation that resulted in 1978 when the federal judiciary declined
to prevent the American Nazi party from marching through the streets
of Skokie, Illinois, 2 a home to many survivors of the Holocaust. 3
duties required them to lead Christian prayers and devotions while safeguarding the
spiritual content of the club's meetings), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1997); Ceniceros
v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that since
no classes met during lunch time, a student-sponsored religious club must be granted the
same rights to meet as other voluntary, non-curricular activities), opinion withdrawn
and superceded by 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997).
The developments in Widmar were further endorsed in Board of Education v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that a school policy of allowing non-curricular groups to
meet on school premises required the school to extend the same privilege to a Christian
group). In Mergens, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, pointed out that in the
federal Equal Access Act of 1984, Congress explicitly extended the Court's reasoning in
Widmar to public secondary schools. Id. at 2364 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074).
For further discussion of Mergens, see David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray
(But Not "Them"!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 273 (1991); Charles J. Russo & David L. Gregory, Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens: A Case Analysis, 17 J. RELIGION & EDUC. 18 (1990).
9. For a thorough discussion of the place of religion in the marketplace of ideas, see
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).

How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS

10. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) [hereinafter Capitol Square III]. Capitol Square III was
decided by the Court at the same time as Rosenberger III.
I I. Id. at 2450. The Court affirmed the appellate court and noted that "[r]eligious
expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2)
occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on
equal terms. .

.

. [and since] [t]hose conditions are satisfied here

. . .

the State may not

bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square." Id. See also infra Part Ill.
12. In Smith v. Collin, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978), the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of
the American Nazi Party to march in Skokie, Illinois. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented, stating that "this is litigation that rests
upon critical, disturbing, and emotional facts, and the issues cut down to the very heart

of the First Amendment." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion of
the events in Skokie, see Franklin S. Haiman, Nazis in Skokie: Anatomy of the
Heckler's Veto, in FREE SPEECH YEARBOOK 11 (Gregg Phifer ed., 1978).
13. More recently, in Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir.
1995), the Klan was involved in another dispute involving a public forum. The Klan
appealed the state's rejection of its application for participation in an Adopt-A-Highway
program based on its policy of excluding individuals and political groups. Id. at 1077.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed that Texas, through the program, had not created a public
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Unfortunately, neither RosenbergerIII nor Capitol Square III fully
addresses nor reconciles the continuing tension surrounding the First
Amendment prohibition on government establishment of religion and
the right of free exercise of religion.' 4 Consequently, the Court has
further confused the treatment of religious symbol and substance in
these decisions. This Essay studies how the Court has exacerbated the
lack of clarity in the constitutional jurisprudence of religion in the
public arena. A close consideration of Rosenberger III and Capitol
Square III is an important propaedeutic to proper analysis of this issue.
This Essay reviews the RosenbergerIII decision, from its beginning
in the district court, to the Fourth Circuit, and finally to the United
States Supreme Court, 5 and it provides an in-depth analysis of the
Supreme Court's Rosenberger opinion. 16 This Essay similarly
assesses Capitol Square III,17 and it reviews the decisions of the
district court, the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme Court. 18 The Essay
then analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Capitol Square II. 9
Using these discussions as a background, the authors survey the
current status of the Supreme Court's religious symbol jurisprudence,
and conclude that the cases offer little guidance to government officials
concerned about the Establishment Clause. 20 Finally, the Essay
presents the text of Clinton Administration directives that are relevant
to these discussions. 2'
II. ROSENBERGER V. RECTOR AND VISITORS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

The University of Virginia, founded by Thomas Jefferson in 1819,
is preserved under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as a
public corporation.22 Student groups among the University's more
than 11,000 undergraduate and 6,000 professional students are
forum, because the program's purpose was to allow citizens to support efforts to control
and reduce litter, not to provide a forum for expressive activity. Id. at 1078. The court
ruled that the state had rejected the Klan's application because the section of highway
was located near a desegregated housing project whose residents had been subject to
harassment and intimidation by the Klan. Id. at 1080. Thus, denial of the application
was a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech. Id.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part II.A-C.
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.A.-C.
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V (Appendix).
22. Rosenberger 1I1, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.

1997]

Religious Symbol and Substance

425

supported by a detailed program designed to bolster extracurricular
activities.23 Before a student organization can submit a request to the
University to compensate outside contractors and service providers
from the Student Activities Fund ("SAF"), which receives its monies
from a mandatory activities fee paid by all full-time students,24 the
group must become a Contracted Independent Organization ("CIO"). 2
The benefit of acquiring CIO status is that, in addition to being
eligible to submit a request for the payment of bills, a recognized CIO
has access to a variety of university facilities, including computer
terminals and meeting rooms.26 Guidelines regulating the use of the
SAF explicitly specify that eligible CIOs will not be reimbursed for the
costs of religious activities. 2' The Guidelines define a religious
activity as one which "primarily promotes or manifests
a particular
28
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.,
In September 1990, Ronald Rosenberger and fellow undergraduates
at the University of Virginia created Wide Awake Productions
("WAP") after they realized that none of the fifteen student-run
publications on campus provided a forum for Christian expression.29
Membership in WAP was open to any student who wished to join,
without regard to sex, race, religion, or color. WAP acquired CIO
status shortly after it was formed. 30 The organization, which was not
affiliated with any particular religious institution, was formed with
three express purposes: to "(1) publish a magazine of philosophical
and religious expressions; (2) facilitate discussion which fosters an
atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints; and
(3) provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural
23. Id.
24. Id. Each full-time student is required to pay $14.00 per semester to the SAF to
support recognized Contracted Independent Organizations. Id.
25. Id. The district court in Rosenberger noted that there are four general criteria for
CIO status: (1) at least 51% of the group's members must be students; (2) the group's
officers must all be full-time, fee-paying students; (3) the group must keep an updated
copy of its constitution on file with the university; and (4) the group must sign an antidiscrimination disclaimer. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795
F. Supp. 175, 177 n.l (W.D. Va. 1992) [hereinafter Rosenberger I], aff'd, 18 F.3d 269
(4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Rosenberger 11], rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
26. Rosenberger 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
27. Id. Other activities which are excluded from reimbursement are "philanthropic
contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the
University's tax exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar
fees, or social, entertainment or related expenses." Id.
28. Id. at 2515.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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backgrounds.' As part of its mission, WAP publishes a newspaper,
Wide Awake: A ChristianPerspective at the University of Virginia.32
Each issue of Wide Awake is distributed on campus free of charge.3 3
Based on comments by editor-in-chief Rosenberger in the first issue
of Wide Awake, the newspaper's twin goals are "to challenge
Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they
proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means., 34 The articles, essays, and
poems exhort the readership to "actualize" Christianity fully in every
aspect of their social, economic, political, and cultural lives.
When Rosenberger sought reimbursement of $5,862 from the SAF
in January 1991 to cover Wide Awake's printing costs, the
Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied the request.
The Committee based its decision on the fact that the newspaper was a
"religious activity" within the meaning of its Guidelines. This was
WAP's first and only request for funds.35
WAP did not dispute that it was engaged in a religious activity as
defined in the SAF Guidelines.36 Even so, WAP appealed the denial
of funds, contending not only that it met the appropriate SAF
Guidelines, but also that the Student Council's action violated the
United States Constitution.37 In March 1991 the full Student Council,
followed in April by the Student Activities Committee, upheld the
decision to deny funds. 38 During this same time, the University
provided financial support for general news publications including The
Yellow Journal, a "humor" magazine which occasionally targets
Christianity as a subject of satire, and Al-Salam, the Muslim Students
Association publication, which seeks to "promote a better
understanding of Islam. ' 39 The fund also contributed support for the
Jewish Law Students Association to "be a focal point for Jewish
activities" and "to encourage law students to participate in Jewish
3 1. Rosenberger 1, 795 F. Supp. at 177 n.3; see also Rosenberger H, 18 F.3d at 27172.
32. Rosenberger 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
33. Id. By June of 1992, 5,000 copies of Wide Awake had been distributed. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Of the 343 CIOs on campus during the 1990-1991 academic year, 118 of the
135 groups which applied for support from the SAF received funding. Id. Fifteen of the
CIOs that received funding were "student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or
academic communications media groups." Id.
36. Rosenberger II, 18 F.3d at 273. See also supra text accompanying note 28
(providing the SAF Guidelines' definition of a "religious activity").
37. Rosenberger 1I, 18 F.3d at 273.
38. Id. at 273-74.
39. Rosenberger IIH, 115 S. Ct. at 2527.
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activities," as well as for the C.S. Lewis Society, which was created to
"promote interest in, and discussion of, various
topics, with a
particular emphasis on the work of the 'Oxford Christians."' 40 The
University contended that these groups received funds as cultural, not
religious, activities, and denied funds to the students' Wide Awake
Christian newspaper venture.4
A. The District Court Decision
Rosenberger and WAP filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia,42 seeking relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 4' The claim alleged that the University's denial of
SAF benefits for their Christian newspaper violated the group
members' First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of44
religion, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the laws.
The students did not dispute the University's assertion that Wide
Awake was a religious activity. 45 Rather, they maintained that the
denial of funds from the SAF solely on the basis of WAP's religious
editorial viewpoint violated their constitutional rights.46 The court
granted summary judgment in favor of the University on all three
counts.47
The district court first addressed the freedom of speech claim. It
relied on Supreme Court precedent 48 to find that the SAF was a "non40. Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
115 S.Ct. 2510 (1994) (No. 94-329).
41. Id. at 6.
42. Rosenberger 1, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
43. Id. at 178. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State ...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
44. Rosenberger 1, 795 F. Supp. at 177-78. The suit also included freedom of the
press and freedom of association claims. Id. In addition, the students also added claims
based on Article I of the Virginia Constitution and the Virginia Act for Religious
Freedom. Id.
45. Id. at 177 n.3.
46. Id. at 177-78.
47. Id. at 183.
48. Id. at 178. The court relied on Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (setting forth a non-public versus limited
public forum analysis to determine what is the required degree of scrutiny) (relying on
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
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public" rather than a "limited public" forum. 49 Relying on this
distinction, the district court held that the University met its burden of
having a reasonable basis for excluding Wide Awake. It observed that
a state may restrict access to a non-public forum if the restriction
regulating speech is "reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because the public officials oppose the speaker's
view." 50 The district court further noted that the "First Amendment
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or
controlled by the government."'"
Turning to the students' claim regarding free exercise of religion,
the district court made two related points in dismissing in favor of the
University. First, it observed that the University did not treat Wide
Awake any differently from other student organizations that were
denied funding.52 Second, it noted that where the alleged burden on
the students' free exercise rights was not substantial, the University,
the public organ of the state, was not required to prove a compelling
state interest in denying the funds.53 Moreover, the court added that
even if it were to concede that the denial of funds did impose a burden
on the students' constitutional rights, the University's desire to avoid
49. Rosenberger 1, 795 F. Supp. at 180-81.
50. Id. at 179 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 182.
53. Id. at 182-83. The court grounded its reasoning on Employment Division, Dept.
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and Goodall v.Stafford County
Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991). The Court in Smith stated that "governmental
actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. The Fourth Circuit in Goodall upheld a
school district's refusal to provide an interpreter for a deaf child in a non-public school.
Goodall, 930 F.2d at 370. The Rosenberger I court interpreted Goodall as "appear[ing]
to have adopted [the Smith] position" that the state is not required to prove a compelling
interest where the burden on religion is not substantial. Rosenberger 1,795 F. Supp. at
183 (citing Goodall, 930 F.2d at 369). See also KR v. Anderson Community Sch.
Corp., 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996) (for a similar ruling denying a full-time instructional
assistant for a student in a Catholic school); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,
103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997) (vacating the ruling of the district court ordering school
board to provide sign language interpreter for student at private school, and remanding
to determine whether denial of services was appropriate exercise of school board's
discretion). But see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(holding that providing a sign language interpreter at a Catholic school did not violate
the Establishment Clause); Russman v. Board of Educ., 22 IDELR 1028 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(ordering sign language interpreter and consulting teacher to provide services on site for
student with disability).
Moreover, in an unusual move, the Court agreed to take a second look at Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which prohibited on-site delivery of Title I services for
students enrolled in a religiously-affiliated non-public school in New York City.
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997) (agreeing to re-examine Aguilar).
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an Establishment Clause violation would constitute a compelling state
interest.54
The district court then dismissed WAP's claim that because SAF
provided money to other "religious groups," it was denied equal
protection. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
University because it concluded that the University did not act with the
requisite discriminatory intent.55
B. The Fourth CircuitDecision
Rosenberger and WAP appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.56 Albeit on different grounds than the
district court, the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed in favor of the
University on both the First Amendment free speech and press claims,
and on the equal protection charge.57
The court began its analysis by holding that WAP's publication of
religious speech in Wide Awake fell within the protective ambit of the
free speech clause of the First Amendment.58 Next, the court reasoned
that although none of the student groups on campus, including WAP,
had a right to SAF monies, once the University made funds "available
to CIOs generally, they must be distributed in a viewpoint-neutral
manner." 59 As such, the court held that the University had, in fact,
engaged in viewpoint discrimination 61 that could be justified only if it
could establish a compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of
church and state.6 '
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the University
had a compelling state interest in refusing to fund WAP by relying
upon the tripartite Lemon v. Kurtzman62 test. First, the court ruled that
54. Rosenberger I, 795 F. Supp. at 183.
55. Id. The court relied on Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352
(4th Cir. 1989), which stated that a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral statute must
establish both disparate effect and discriminatory intent. Irby, 889 F.2d at 1352.
56. Rosenberger 11, 18 F.3d at 276.
57. id. at 270. The state claims and free exercise claim were not raised on appeal. Id.
at 276.
58. Id. at 280.
59. Id. at 280-81.
60. Id. at 281. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court on
this point. Id. See also Rosenberger 1, 795 F. Supp. at 181-82 (finding that the
university did not engage in viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger 111, 115 S. Ct. at
2516 (acknowledging disagreement between appellate and district courts on this issue).
61. Rosenberger 11, 18 F.3d at 281.
62. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a discussion of the Lemon test, see supra note 3.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger III subsequently ignored the Lemon
test, thereby casting further doubt on the contemporary viability of this seemingly
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prohibiting funds for religious activities did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the proscription in the guidelines was
not motivated by an impermissible purpose.63 Second, it reasoned that
the University's refusal to provide financial support for such activities
did not impermissibly inhibit religion.64 Third, the court held that
providing funding to Wide Awake would have constituted an
excessive entanglement with religion by the government in the capacity
of the University.65 It reached this result by explaining that the
"[d]irect monetary subsidization of [WAP] . . .would... send an
unmistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports
Christian values and wishes to promote the wide promulgation of such
values. 66 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the University had
a compelling state interest in refusing to grant funds to WAP.67
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit held that the University's restriction
against funding religious activities was narrowly tailored to achieve its
stated purpose.68
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a five to four ruling,6 9 reversed in favor of
Rosenberger and WAP. The Court held that denial of funding for
Wide Awake infringed WAP's constitutionally guaranteed rights of
free speech and free exercise of religion.70
ubiquitous constitutional law jurisprudential standard. See infra Part II.C. At the same
time, the endorsement test that has surfaced as a possible replacement for Lemon
continues to remain viable based upon the Court's extensive debate of it in Capitol
Square Ill. See generally Capital Square III, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2447 (1995). See also
infra note 148 (discussing the endorsement test). For discussions of the continuing
viability of Lemon, see Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice out of the Lemon Test,
72 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch? A Comment on Professor
Paulsen's Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 883 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993).
63. Rosenberger I1, 18 F.3d at 284.
64. Id. at 285.
65. Id. at 285-86. The court held, in fact, that "the primary effect of an SAF subsidy
of Wide Awake publication costs would be to advance religion." Id.
66. Id. at 286.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 286-87. As a final matter, the Fourth Circuit summarily rejected the
students' equal protection claim as lacking the requisite discriminatory intent. Id. at
288.
69. Rosenberger 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2513. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id.
Justices O'Connor and Thomas each filed concurring opinions. Id. at 2525, 2528.
Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at
2533.
70. Id. at 2520, 2524-25.
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1. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy, relying
primarily on Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,7' held that the University violated the free speech rights of
WAP because the school's actions constituted viewpoint
discrimination." Justice Kennedy illustrated his point by noting the
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination. The former
may be permissible, he noted, if it helps to preserve the purpose of a
limited forum, while the latter is presumptively inappropriate when it is
directed against speech that might otherwise fall within a forum's
limitations. 73 As a preliminary matter, Justice Kennedy held that
contrary to the ruling below, the SAF constituted a limited public
forum, albeit "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographical
sense." 74 Therefore, he found it essential to apply viewpoint
discrimination analysis."
Justice Kennedy rejected both arguments advanced by the
University in support of its refusal to make third-party payments for
WAP. He dismissed the first argument that the University practiced
content rather than viewpoint discrimination. He noted that it was
WAP's specific Christian editorial viewpoint, rather than a general
opposition to the subject of religion, that led to the University's refusal
to make third-party payments, as other groups were supported by
University funds.76
Justice Kennedy rejected the second, and more complex, argument
wherein the University maintained that requiring it to fund all available
viewpoints would improperly limit its right to make academic
decisions.77 He observed that such reasoning applies only when the
University itself is speaking.7 8 Kennedy also rebuffed the
University's position that Lamb's Chapel had limited applicability
because financial resources were more limited than physical facilities.79
Consequently, the Court held that "the regulation invoked to deny SAF
support, both in its terms and in its application to these petitioners, is a
71. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). See also infra text accompanying notes 144-46, 173, 175
(noting the Supreme Court's reliance on Lamb's Chapel in its decision in Capitol Square
111, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2448 (1995)).
72. Rosenberger I1, 115 S. Ct. at 2518.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2517.
75. Id. at 2518.
76. Id. at 2517-18.
77. Id. at 2518.
78. Id. at 2518-19.
79. Id. at 2519-20.
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denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 80
Acknowledging that the Fourth Circuit had relied on Lemon in
sustaining the University's viewpoint discrimination, Justice Kennedy
found it necessary to examine whether the decision to refuse funding
to WAP would have been justified under the Establishment Clause.
He determined that there would not have been a Establishment Clause
violation because the University's policy of funding student
publications was otherwise neutral. 8' In fact, he pointed out that WAP
sought funding not because of its religious editorial perspective, but
because it was a recognized student publication under University
guidelines.82 Kennedy noted that, if anything, the University
distanced itself from student organizations, disclaimed them as
University agents, and paid the monies directly to third parties, rather
than to the organizations themselves.
Justice Kennedy took the discussion one step further and maintainedthat if the University had scrutinized the content of student speech to
decide whether there was too much religious content, then the school's
conduct would have amounted to "censorship . . . far more
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause's dictates than would
governmental provision of secular printing services on a religion-blind
basis. 84 As such, he concluded that funding WAP, along with the
other student publications, would not violate the Establishment
Clause.
2. The Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion but authored a
separate concurrence to emphasize what she perceived as the best way
to resolve the conflict between the "two bedrock principles" of
''governmental neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of
religious activities. 86 In so doing, she offered that, as in the case at
bar, the Court sometimes has to draw fine lines based on unique
factual settings. Therefore, she examined the four elements that were
80. Id. at 2520.
8 1. Id. at 2522.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2523-24. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a description of how
a student group obtains CIO status, which then makes them eligible to submit requests to
the University for the payment of bills.
84. Id. at 2524.
85. Id. at 2524-25.
86. Id. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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present in the University's program that she believed violated Wide
Awake's right to free speech. 7
First, Justice O'Connor noted that student organizations, including
WAP, remained strictly independent of the University.88 Second, the
payment in question was made directly to the private vendor and did
not pass through WAP's coffers.8 9 Under these circumstances,
Justice O'Connor asserted, the payment method was more like
providing equal access to a printing press that was generally available,
and less like donating a block grant to a religious institution. Third,
the probability of any governmental endorsement was minimal under
the circumstances since Wide Awake competed with fifteen other
student publications that received similar funding from the
University. 90 Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that even though the
issue had not been raised, there may be a free speech clause basis for a
student to refuse to pay the student fee to avoid supporting speech with
which he or she disagrees. 9'
Justice O'Connor thus maintained that, in light of these
considerations, the Court's decision neither "trumpets the supremacy
of the neutrality principle nor signals the demise of the funding
prohibition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 92 Rather, she was
satisfied that the Court focused on the specifics of the University's
funding scheme and acted to safeguard the rights of Wide Awake.
Justice Thomas' lengthy concurrence 93 essentially rebutted Justice
Souter's dissent. The first of Justice Thomas' two points was
intertwined with an historical analysis of the role of James Madison in

87. Id. at 2526-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor quoted the University's
agreement with the ClOs, which stated that:
The University is a Virginia public corporation and the CIO is not part of that
corporation, but rather exists and operates independently of the University . .
• . The parties understand and agree that this Agreement is the only source of
any control the University may have over the CIO or its activities ....
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Joint App. of the Writ of Cert. at 27, Rosenberger
11, 18 F.3d 269 (No.94-329)).
89. Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that other publications,
such as the humor magazine The Yellow Journal, have previously satirized Christianity.
Id. O'Connor went on to state that because the University allowed for "non-religious,
anti-religious and competing religious viewpoints in the forum supported by the
University, any perception that the University endorses one particular viewpoint would
be illogical." Id.
9 1. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 2528-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Virginia's "Assessment Controversy. 94 In so doing, he rejected the
dissent's argument that the government is required to discriminate
against religious groups by excluding them from generally available
financial subsidies.95
Justice Thomas' second point differed from the dissent's position
but not to funds.96
that governmental neutrality extended to facilities
97 and contemporary 98
He bolstered his position by noting historical
precedents in which the government offered support to religious
institutions. He also noted a lack of conceptual consistency: the
dissent would apparently accept granting Wide Awake access to the
University's own printing press, but would not accept permitting a
third party to render the same service. 99
3. The Dissent
Justice Souter's dissent,'0° which was almost twice as long as the
majority opinion, differed on at least three major points. First, Justice
Souter argued that the Court violated the Establishment Clause by
ordering an instrumentality of the state to provide direct support for
religious evangelization.' ° Second, even though the payment was to a
supposedly neutral third party, he distinguished Rosenberger from a
number of other cases in which the Court permitted support for
religious activities.'0 2 He maintained that this case violated the
Establishment Clause because "there is no third party standing between
94. Id. at 2528-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). The debate concerned a bill in Virginia
which provided for the collection of a specific tax to support clergy in teaching
religion. Id. at 2528.
95. Id. at 2528-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 2531 nn.3-4 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing a number of examples of
"what amount to direct funding" in early Acts of Congress).
98. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding the tax-exempt
status of churches).
99. Rosenberger 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2532 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2533-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2535-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permitting the state to fund a sign language interpreter for a student
in a Catholic high school because such a service is not skewed toward religion and does
not offend the Establishment Clause); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a tuition payment, provided by the state, for a
blind student enrolled in a Bible college, because it did not advance religion in a way
which was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (Minnesota statute permitting a tax deduction for tuition, textbooks, and
transportation for parents of children in both public and non-public schools, in
compliance with the Establishment Clause).
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the government and the ultimate religious beneficiary to break the
circuit by its independent discretion to put state money to religious
use."'' 0 3 Third, Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the
University could not engage in viewpoint discrimination.' °4 He was
of the opinion, however, that the University had properly denied
funding to Wide Awake because in so doing, it prohibited religious
advocacy or proselytizing that applied equally to other religious groups
on campus.
D. Analysis
In Rosenberger III, the First Amendment rights of free exercise of
religion and of free speech arguably trumped First Amendment
establishment concerns. Rosenberger III represents the apparent
melding of the ascendant socio-political tide in the United States into
the libertarian constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
These interwoven trends ultimately may lead to a reassessment of
some of the most fundamental principles of our system of government.
Meanwhile, if indeed it ever existed, the mythical Jeffersonian Wall of
Separation0 6 between church and state continues to be dismantled,
most ironically, at Jefferson's pride, the University of Virginia.
President Clinton and his Republican rivals jointly promise the further
injection of religion into the realm of public education.'0 7 Rosenberger
III is the most important and most recent piece in this rapidly emerging
new jurisprudential fabric that melds dramatically liberalized speech
and press rights with the right to free exercise of religion.

103. Rosenberger 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2547-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. Despite the great amount of ink spilled over the "wall" of separation between
church and state erected by Jefferson, the Commonwealth of Virginia continued to
support religious institutions well into the nineteenth century, even during Jefferson's
own lifetime. For a good discussion, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Prohibition of Student
Religious Activities on Public School Premises: Unreasonable Content-Based
Restriction, 4 COOLEY L. REV. 117, 145 n.199 (1986).
107. See, e.g., Voluntary School Prayer Protection Act, S. 185, 105th Cong. (1997)
(introduced by Senator Helms and prohibiting the provision of federal funds to state or
local educational agencies that deny or prevent participation in constitutional prayer in
public schools). In addition, joint resolutions have been introduced in both the House
and the Senate proposing an amendment to the United States Constitution providing
that the Constitution shall not prohibit voluntary prayer in public schools. S.J. Res.
15, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 55, 105th Cong. (1997).
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CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND

ADVISORY BOARD V. PINETrE'08
In November 1993, the Ohio Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
("Klan"), through its officer Donnie A. Carr, applied to the Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board to erect a large cross, ten feet in
height, on Capitol Square in Columbus, Ohio. 0 9 Capitol Square is a
ten-acre plaza, owned by the state of Ohio, surrounding the Ohio
Statehouse." 0 The Board is authorized by Ohio statute to regulate
public access to the square. The Ohio Administrative Code makes the
square available for "free discussion of public questions, or for
activities of a broad public purpose.""' For many years the Square
has been used for gatherings, speeches, and festivals that celebrate a
variety of secular and religious causes.
In order to use the Square, a group is required to fill out an official
form and meet several safety, sanitation, and non-interference criteria
that are neutral to the speech content of the proposed event."l 2 In
recent years, groups as diverse as the Ku Klux Klan and various
homosexual rights organizations have used the Square under this
policy to hold public rallies." 3 Furthermore, unattended displays,
including a state-sponsored Christmas tree and a privately-sponsored
menorah, have also been erected in Capitol Square under the Board's
policies. '
Carr's application to erect the cross followed a month in which the
Board reversed its earlier decision not to allow unattended holiday
displays on the Square in 1993. Following the reversal of the ban on
such displays, the Board approved a state-sponsored Christmas tree
and, on the day of Carr's application, it granted a rabbi's application to
erect a menorah on the Square." 5 Carr's application requested
permission to erect the cross from December 8, 1993, to December 24,
1993.16
The Board denied Carr's application on December 3, 1993, and
informed the Ku Klux Klan in a letter that the decision "'was made
upon the advice of counsel, in a good faith attempt to comply with the
108. Capitol Square I!!, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
109. Id. at 2445.
110. Id. at 2444.
111. Id. (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 128-4-02(A) (1994)).
112. Id. at 2444.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2445.
116. Id.
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Ohio and United States Constitutions, as they have been interpreted in
relevant decisions by the Federal and State Courts. ' ' ' 7 After
unsuccessfully seeking administrative relief, the Klan filed suit to
compel the issuance of a permit.
A. The DistrictCourt Decision
On December 20, 1993, the Ohio Klan, through its representatives
Vincent Pinette and Donnie Carr, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio"' seeking a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction of the Board's order.
The district court consolidated the hearing on the motion with trial on
the merits of the Klan's First Amendment claim, and granted the
Klan's requested relief." 9
The district court initially addressed the question of whether the
Square was a traditional public forum. Based on the Board's longestablished practice of holding the Square open to the speech of
heterogeneous groups, the district court held that
the Square should
20
indeed be considered a traditional public forum.
The district court cited the significant constitutional protection
afforded speech in the traditional public forum, specifically noting that
the "First Amendment Free Speech Clause prohibits content-based
regulation of the use of public fora."' 2 1 It noted that religious
expression is entitled to no less protection than other forms of
expression under the Constitution.' The district court further stated
that the government may not exclude speech from a traditional public
forum unless the exclusion is necessary to achieve 23a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
The Board, however, raised the countervailing consideration,
proffered as a compelling state interest, that the erection of a cross in a
117. Id. (citing Joint App. of the Writ of Cert. at 47, Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-780)).
118. 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1183 (S.D. Ohio 1993) [hereinafter Capitol Square I].
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1185.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which held that a
university exclusionary policy prohibiting the use of university buildings was
unconstitutional since it failed to regulate in a content-neutral fashion).
123. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983), which held that the First Amendment was not violated where a union elected by
public school teachers as exclusive bargaining representative was granted access to
teacher mailboxes and interschool mail system while access was denied to a rival union,
as such exclusion was not viewpoint discrimination and was a reasonable regulation on
speech in light of union's responsibilities to teachers).
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square that also is home to the seat of government of the state of Ohio
amounted to an "establishment of religion in violation of the First
Amendment."'' 24 The Board cited County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union 25 to bolster its argument that placing the cross
on Capitol Square was an Establishment Clause violation.' 2 6
The district court distinguished County of Allegheny on its facts,
stating that it "involved very obvious efforts by the government to
associate itself with a particular religious display."'' 27 In Capitol
Square I the district court concluded that the situation before it was
more analogous to the circumstances before the Sixth Circuit in
Americans Unitedfor Separationof Church and State v. City of Grand

Rapids, 28 and went on to interpret County of Allegheny as did the
Sixth Circuit in Grand Rapids. 29 The district court noted that in
Grand Rapids, the Sixth Circuit held that the unattended display of a
large menorah in a plaza surrounded by public and private buildings
did not constitute a state endorsement of religion, and similarly
distinguished County of Allegheny on its facts." 0

124. Id.
125. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (finding an Establishment Clause violation in a holiday
cr&he display where the government "effectively associated itself with that particular
religious message" by giving special preference to the private group displaying the
creche, mentioning the creche in government press releases, and using similar visual
images as were used in the cr&he display with official government signs).
126. Capitol Square 1, 844 F. Supp. at 1187.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1185-87.
129. The district court in Capitol Square I discussed the Sixth Circuit opinion in
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d
1538 (6th Cir. 1992), and how the Sixth Circuit interpreted and applied the Supreme
Court decision in County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989). Id. The Capitol Square I court determined that "[a]pplying the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in Grand Rapids to the facts and issues presented in the instant case leaves
little doubt that the plaintiffs must be permitted to erect a cross on the Capitol Square."
Id. at 1187. The Capitol Square I court borrowed the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Grand
Rapids and focused upon the fact that the request to use Capitol Square "comes from a
private party." Id. (citing Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1553). Thus, the Capitol Square I
court stated that the proposed Klan "'display is privately sponsored, and it stands in a
traditional public forum to which all citizens have equal access."' Id. at 1186 (quoting
Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1545). In contrast, the Capitol Square I court noted that in
County of Allegheny the county gave a preferential position to a creche in a holiday
display, associated itself with the creche in county press releases, and "visually linked"
the county with the creche by placing next to official county signs two evergreens
identical to those in the creche display. Id. (citing Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at 1545). In
so doing, the Capitol Square I district court noted, the "county effectively associated
itself with [a] particular religious message." Id. (citing Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d at
1545).
130. Capitol Square 1, 844 F. Supp. at 1186.
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The court explained that, pursuant to Grand Rapids, the inquiry of
whether the cross display offended the Establishment Clause would
properly focus on the second prong of the Lemon test.' 3' Therefore,
the district court restricted its analysis to the question of whether a
reasonable observer would perceive the government action allowing
the cross display as an endorsement of a particular religion. The
district court concluded that the private aspects of the display, in
combination with facts and circumstances evincing Ohio's "toleration
of religious and secular pluralism," would prohibit the reasonable
observer from concluding that the Klan's cross display constituted
32 a
state endorsement of religion offending the Establishment Clause.
B. The Sixth CircuitDecision
In affirming in favor of the Ku Klux Klan, the Sixth Circuit
reviewed the decision of the trial court, on the premise that the denial
of the Klan's application involved the consideration of "wrongs
capable of repetition yet evading review.' 33
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Capitol Square is
indeed a public forum. The appellate court further agreed that in order
to justify a content-based regulation under these circumstances, the
state must show that its regulation is necessary to forward
a
31 4
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve its end.'
To determine whether the erection of the cross would offend the
13
Establishment Clause, the Sixth Circuit likewise employed Lemon. 1
The court agreed that Lemon had been subsequently refined, so that
the proper line of inquiry was whether the erection of the cross would
be perceived by the reasonable observer as a state endorsement of
religion.136 The Sixth Circuit noted that the trial court had properly
applied the law in distinguishing this case from County of Allegheny,
which involved a ceremonial courthouse
staircase location that could
137
not be considered a public forum.
The Sixth Circuit summarily discounted the Board's reliance on Doe
v. Small,'38 a Seventh Circuit case that had intimated that the physical
distance from the seat of government may have some determinative
13 1.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the Lemon test.
Capitol Square 1, 844 F. Supp. at 1187.
30 F.3d 675, 677 (6th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Capitol Square 11].
Id.
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 679.
Id.
964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
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effect on whether a particular expression might reasonably be
perceived as a state endorsement of religion. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the language in Small amounted to nothing more than a
"gratuitous observation" used to support the Seventh Circuit's opinion
that the park was likewise a public forum. 39 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's order that the Klan's representatives be
issued a permit to display their cross.' 4°
C. The Supreme Court Decision
4
The United States Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision,' '
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts permitting the Klan's
display of the cross in the state capitol's public square. Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court that the erection of the Klan's cross
would not be an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion,
and
42
therefore could not be prohibited by the First Amendment.1
1. The Plurality and Concurring Opinions
As a preliminary matter, the Court's opinion disposed of the Klan's
argument that the Board's actual reason for denying the permit was its
unconstitutional censorship, because of its disapproval of the Klan's
political views. The Court noted that since that argument had not been
raised below, the opinion would be limited to the consideration of the
Establishment Clause issue.'43
Justice Scalia's consideration of the Establishment Clause issue
rested primarily on the Court's decisions in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
45
44
Moriches Union Free School District' and Widmar v. Vincent.
Scalia noted that Capitol Square, like Widmar and Lamb's Chapel,
involved speech that was not sponsored by the state, was expressed on

139. Capitol Square H, 30 F.3d at 680.
140. Id. at 675.
141. Capitol Square 11, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1994). Justice Scalia's majority opinion
was joined in Parts I, II, and III by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Breyer. Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Thomas filed a
separate concurrence. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and in the judgment; she was
joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. Justice Souter's concurrence in part and in the
judgment was joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
filed dissenting opinions.
142. Id. at 2450.
143. Id. at 2445.
144. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
145. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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government property open to the public, and was subject to the same
application process as other types of private expression.'"
Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion, which was joined only by the
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concluded that
religious expression "cannot violate" the First Amendment
Establishment Clause when it is purely private and occurs in a
traditional public forum. 47 In this portion of his opinion, Scalia
indicated that the "so-called endorsement test"' has "no antecedent in
4 9
our jurisprudence.'
He noted that the Court had previously equated
' 50
the term "endorsement" with "promotion" or "favoritism.'
Therefore, he reasoned, any neutral policy that produced an incidental
benefit to religion could not be properly construed as an
unconstitutional "endorsement."151
Justice Scalia argued that the government's reliance on County of
Allegheny and Lynch v. Donnelly'5 2 was misplaced. He explained
that where the government has not fostered or encouraged the public to
mistake private religious speech for government endorsement of
religion, the Establishment Clause is not violated.'53 Scalia likened the
"endorsement" test, favored in the concurring and dissenting opinions,
to "transferred endorsement" and argued that it would lead government
entities, such as school districts, to "guess whether some
undetermined critical mass" of the public might perceive access as
"endorsement of a religious viewpoint."'' 54 He noted that the
continued application of the endorsement test to Establishment Clause
cases would endanger "the settled principle that policies providing
incidental benefits to religion do not contravene the Establishment
146. Capitol Square I1, 115 S. Ct. at 2447.
147. Id. at 2450.
148. Id. at 2447. The "endorsement test" determines whether the challenged
government practice has either the prohibited purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion.
County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1988). The
petitioners argued that the state's content-based restriction was constitutional because
an observer might mistake private expression for officially "endorsed" religious
expression. Capitol Square Ii, 115 S.Ct. at 2447.
149. Id. at 2448.
150. Id. at 2447 (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593).
151. Id. at 2447-48.
152. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (finding legitimate secular purpose, no advancement of
religion and therefore no establishment clause violation where city included nativity
scene in Christmas display for purpose of celebrating and depicting origins of holiday).
See also Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). See supra notes 125-29
and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's reliance on County of
Allegheny.
153. Rosenberger I, 115 S.Ct. at 2448.
154. Id. at 2449.
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Clause.' 55 In closing, Justice Scalia indicated that a state cannot ban
all religious speech or force it to be accompanied by a disclaimer of
public sponsorship, because
this would constitute prohibited content56
1
discrimination.
based
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justices Breyer and
Souter, disagreed with Part IV of the Scalia opinion. Justice
O'Connor saw "no necessity to carve out, as the plurality opinion
would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum
context."' 5 7 Justice O'Connor cited with approval the analysis the
Court employed in County of Allegheny and Lynch while repudiating
the plurality's position that the endorsement test should be limited to
expression by the government.' 58 She pointed out that Capitol
Square's status as an open public forum did not dispose of whether the
state may be endorsing religion. O'Connor noted that "[a]t some
point, for example, a private religious group may so dominate a public
forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a
demonstration of approval."' 59
Although Justice O'Connor made her disagreement with the
plurality's relegation of the endorsement test abundantly clear, she also
reasoned that she could not accept the dissent's argument that the test
should focus on the actual perception of the individual observers of the
religious display.' 60 Justice O'Connor explained that pursuant to the
rationale elucidated in County of Allegheny, the endorsement inquiry
must focus on the "reasonable" observer who is "deemed aware of the
history and context
of the community and forum in which the religious
' 161
appears."
display
The plurality could envision no circumstance where private religious
expression in a public forum could be mistaken for government
endorsement of religion. To the extent the Court's decision in Lynch
could be construed to the contrary, Justice Scalia asserted, "the case
neither holds nor even remotely assumes that the government's neutral
treatment of private religious expression can be unconstitutional."' 62
Justice Scalia most interestingly noted that the perpetuation of the
"endorsement" test would render religious speech as unprotected as
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 2450.
Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2452 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
Id. at 2454 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
Id. at 2458-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Capitol Square I1, 115 S.Ct. at 2455 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 2448.
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pornography, and he declared this bizarre result "perverse. 163
However, his analysis neglects a salient fact: sexually explicit and
commercial speech have not traditionally been subject to review under
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As Justice Stevens
indicated, this point is not lost on the dissent: "conspicuously absent
from the plurality's opinion is any mention of the values served by the
Establishment Clause."'64

Scalia's observations are based on two fundamental concepts. The
first is that the American society has ceased to be, if it ever was,
secular. Justice Kennedy implicitly makes this argument in
Rosenberger III. In fact, that is the area of substantial contention
here-whether and at what point society needs to concern itself with
the fact that "private" expressions become "public." If Justice Scalia
chooses to ignore the endorsement test, he should state why he
believes it is irrelevant. Rather, he seems to endeavor to write the
Establishment Clause out of the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia's views are not a misapprehension of the contrary
position; rather, they evince a belief that the values expressed in the
Establishment Clause are overtly and exclusively temporal and secular.
He believes that modem society is not threatened by the inculcation of
religious mores into the political sphere.1 65
Scalia's perceptive comments on pornographic and commercial
speech are illustrative of his second salient concept. He asks us to
consider the crucially important place of religious expression in the
Constitution. But, he cannot ignore the fact that no other form of
expression is conditioned by a clause that warns that the government
"shall make no law respecting its establishment."1 66 Scalia astutely
points out that there is no formal Establishment Clause equivalent for
pornographic or commercial speech. 67 Yet, perhaps there is an
effective de facto establishment clause for pornography and
commercial speech: the Establishment Clause itself.

163. Id. at 2449.
164. Id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. In a play on words, Scalia, a Roman Catholic, told students at a prayer breakfast
sponsored by the Mississippi College School of Law, "[wie are fool's for Christ's
sake," and explained that the word cretin, or fool, is derived from the French word for
Christian. Scalia Says Christians Should Stand Tall, 4 DALLAS/FORT WORTH HERITAGE
I I (May 1996)<http://www.fni.com/heritage/may96. He argued that "[olne can be
sophisticated and believe in God. Reason and intellect are not to be laid aside where
matters of religion are concerned." Id.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
167. Capitol Square 1II, 115 S. Ct. at 2449.
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2. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the historical interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. In attempting to repudiate Justice Scalia's
approach, he highlighted the opinion of one of the Court's most famed
literalists, Justice Black. Stevens warned that the position of the
plurality "entangles two sovereigns in the propagation of religion and it
disserves the principle of tolerance that underlies the prohibition
' 68
against state action 'respecting an establishment of religion.""9
In her brief dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg focused on the
lack of an adequate disclaimer "to disassociate the religious symbol
from the State."'' 69 She identified as the purpose of the Establishment
Clause "to uncouple government from church." 7 ° Thus, she
concluded, the display violated the Establishment Clause because "[n]o
plainly visible sign informed the public that the cross belonged to the
Klan and that Ohio's government did not endorse the display's
message."''
Neglected throughout the decision is the point that, by stating that
the private religious expression in a public forum cannot be construed
as government endorsement of religion, Justice Scalia has melded Free
168. Id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), signed into law by President Clinton on November 16, 1993, was enacted
with the express intention of restoring the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-I to bb-4 (1994). The test had been virtually eliminated by the
Court's controversial decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, announced a startling, sweeping standard designed to vitiate the First Amendment
free exercise clause, stating that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest." Id. at 886 n.3.
In pertinent part, RFRA mandates that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a). RFRA goes on to state an exception: that the
"[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest." Id. § 2000bb-l(b). For commentary on RFRA,
see Symposium, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171 (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the
First Amendment: Congress, Section 5 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995).
169. Capitol Square 11I, 115 S. Ct. at 2474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (citing Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2475 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Ginsburg's view, the disclaimer
attached by the Klan to the display was inadequate as it did not identify the Klan as
sponsor, was not legible from a distance, and did not state unequivocally that the state
did not endorse the display. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Speech and Establishment Clause analyses. Prior to Part IV of the
plurality opinion, the fact that religious expression occurred in a
traditional public forum had no legal significance under the
Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia's argument would make the
location of religious expression determinative of whether a state may
proffer a narrowly tailored policy aimed at serving the principles of the
Establishment Clause as a compelling state interest sufficient to permit
a content-based speech restriction. In effect, content-based judicial
scrutiny of expression-such as censorship-would allow the Court
to discriminate against the pernicious motives of those such as the
Klan who would provide symbols of religious substance such as the
cross.
D. Analysis
After Capitol Square III, a state cannot regulate private religious
speech or expression without the risk of violating the protection of the
First Amendment when the religious expression is "(1) purely private
and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly
announced and open to all on equal terms."' 7 2 Further, the
Establishment Clause is not violated by a state policy that confers
indirect or incidental benefits upon an establishment of religion.
Therefore, if the Ku Klux Klan wants to erect a cross in a public
square near the site of the state capitol, it may. Consistent with the
Court's reasoning in Mergens that permission to act in a public forum
is not governmental endorsement of a specific group's message, the
fear that the public may perceive this as governmental endorsement of
Christianity or an endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan itself is not a
sufficiently compelling reason to permit state prohibition of this type of
expression.
It can be asked how CapitolSquare III came to the Supreme Court
as a religion case when the Ku Klux Klan is not a religious
organization and the Klan's use of the cross is arguably in the form of
a political, not religious, statement. The Ku Klux Klan's promotion of
hatred, bigotry, and racism is totally antithetical to all that is holy.
Moreover, its ceremonial use of the burning cross has historically been
employed to restrict others' rights, not to convey the right of all
religious views to be expressed on an equal basis. One would not
fault the Capitol Square Advisory Board for denying the Klan's
application to erect a statue of a sheeted Klansman, for example,
because there is no social value in allowing such a display. The
172. Capitol Square HII,115 S. Ct. at 2450.
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Board's fatal mistake was that it acknowledged the Klan's cross as a
religious symbol, implicating the Establishment Clause, instead of
what the cross really connoted in this context: a prominent political
and racist symbol of white supremacy. By taking the symbolic
meaning of the cross completely out of its contextual religious history,
the controversy was stripped of its true prejudicial symbolic meaning
and erroneously transformed into a legitimate religious issue by the
courts. As long as the underlying connotation of the private
expression is hidden to the general public, its display in an open forum
is permissible as religious expression. But, ignoring the argument that
the Klan's use of the cross in this instance is politically and not
religiously motivated, private religious expression thereby enjoys full
protection under the First Amendment. Because a religious symbol is
implicated in the controversy, the question is not whether the state
violates the Free Speech Clause by disallowing private religious
expression in a public forum. Rather, the issue is more properly
whether the government violates the Establishment Clause by allowing
it. The Court made no effort whatsoever to appreciate the real
dynamics and motives of the Klan in CapitolSquare III.
Relying on Lamb's Chapel17 and Widmar, 74 the Court in Capitol
Square III rejected the compelling-state-interest Establishment Clause
defense, because the state did not sponsor the religious expression, the
property was open to the public to a wide variety of uses, and access
to the forum occurred on an equal basis.' 75 The Establishment Clause,
the Court concluded, applies only to direct governmental expression
and never was meant to temper private religious expression connected
to the state only through its occurrence in a public forum. 176 Any
benefit to a religious group from use of the public forum would be
incidental and shared by other groups.' 7' The message here is that the
Establishment Clause is violated only when a state affirmatively
endorses or favors a religion through its own speech; any indirect or
incidental benefit to a religion is permissible.
The proximity of the cross display to a seat of government, which
might be mistakenly perceived by a reasonable observer as
unconstitutional official endorsement of Christianity, does not violate
the Establishment Clause when other displays have been given the
same access under a content-neutral policy. The plurality rejected the
1 73.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Capitol Square 1Ii, 115 S. Ct. at 2448.
Id. at 2449.
Id.
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application of the "endorsement test," as this was not a case in which
the religious expression was by the government itself, or in which the
government discriminated in favor of religious expression or activity.
It matters not that an "outsider" or "uninformed" individual may jump
to the conclusion that the state sponsored the expression. As long as
the state provides an open forum, the religious expression is purely
private, and there is no realistic danger that the "community" would
think that the state endorsed the religion, there is no Establishment
Clause violation.
Justices O'Connor and Souter, both concurring in the judgment,
and Justice Stevens, dissenting, took issue with Justice Scalia on this
point, asserting that the endorsement test should be extended beyond
direct government speech or favoritism to encompass private religious
expression in a public forum. Justice O'Connor's test would be
whether a reasonable, informed observer, aware of the history and
context of the community and forum in which the religious display
appears, would view a government practice as endorsing religion,
regardless of governmental intent or encouragement.178 She reasoned
that a religious display, like the Klan's cross, would otherwise be
precluded so long as some passersby, unaware of the forum and
context, would find an endorsement of religion.17 9 Justice
O'Connor's "ultra-reasonable" observer, therefore, would not
encompass an "outsider" to the community, a tourist, or a young child
passing by who knew nothing of the history of Capitol Square or of
the Klan's history of distorted evil use of the symbol of the cross.
This test would not impute the Klan's private religious expression,
adequately disclaimed, in a public forum near a seat of government, to
the state.
Justice Stevens' dissent agreed that the endorsement test was
appropriate but he disagreed on the standard. His test would be
whether a reasonable observer would objectively perceive
governmental sponsorship of a private religious display. 8 ° His
reasonable observer would be less knowledgeable than Justice
O'Connor's "ideal" or "ultra-reasonable" observer. 8 , This rule is
more sensitive than Justice O'Connor's because it takes into account
the community "outsiders," the "non-adherents," and the
"uninformed." Thus, Justice Stevens argues that any reasonable
observer of a religious symbol placed unattended near a seat of
178.
179.
180.
18 1.

Id. at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2466 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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government would typically assume that the state has implicitly
endorsed the message by allowing its use of the forum.'82
Similarly, Justice Souter would extend the endorsement test "by
asking whether the practice in question creates the appearance of
endorsement to the reasonable observer."18 3 What is important is
whether, under the specific circumstances of the case, the state policy
has the effect of endorsing religion. 84 The Establishment Clause may
then be violated in situations other than religious expression by the
government itself or active governmental favoritism. Were it
otherwise, the result would be a contracting out of religion by
encouraging private religious expression to dominate the forum, such
as happened in reaction to the erection of the Klan's cross in Capitol
Square. However, Justice Souter admits that an Establishment Clause
violation can be cured by a disclaimer accompanying a private,
unattended display sufficiently large and clear to preclude any
reasonable inference that the cross was government sponsored, or a
policy restricting all private, unattended displays to one area of the
square with a permanent disclaimer of similar content marking the area
for private expression. 85 But Justice Souter also recognized that the
presence of a disclaimer may not adequately dispel the notion that the
property owner
endorses the religious expression by allowing it to be
8 6
displayed.
As Justice Ginsburg points out, the purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to "uncouple government from church."'' 87 If, however,
states are denied the power to prevent private displays of religious
symbols from being erected on governmental property, the values of
the Establishment Clause are disserved. A separation of church and
state is not accomplished when government policies benefit religion
either directly, through government expression or action promoting or
favoring religion, or indirectly, through government sponsorship or
support of religious speech or expression. The line cannot be drawn
between direct and indirect benefits, for it may be impossible at times
to distinguish the two. While some, like Justice Scalia, will view the
use of government property as an indirect benefit, others, like Justice
Souter, will see it as a direct benefit.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2467
at 2458
(Souter,
at 2462
at 2462
at 2475

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Souter, J., concurring).
J., concurring).
(Souter, J., concurring).
n.2 (Souter, ., concurring).
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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REFLECTIONS ON THE COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE OF
RELIGIOUS SYMBOL AND SUBSTANCE

The principal disagreement between the plurality and the concurring
opinions in Capitol Square III added fuel to the fire in the ongoing
debate over the continuing validity of the "endorsement" test in the
public forum/ private speaker context.
Tolerance is not the same as endorsement. Even so, they are often
very difficult to distinguish. Religious speech in an open, public
forum by a private speaker must be tolerated by the government under
the First Amendment. However, private religious expression that
stands unattended in a public forum looks like endorsement by virtue
of its location and should not have to be tolerated by the government.
In both of these recent decisions, the Free Speech Clause trumps the
Establishment Clause for a majority of the Court. However, it is clear
that the Court itself is in conflict: there is profound internal
disagreement as to what test to apply and what standards to use when
the Religion Clauses clash.1 88 The unfortunate consequence is that
these opinions provide little guidance to government officials
concerned about the Establishment Clause.
The fact that the Rosenberger III and Capitol Square III opinions
proceed along two distinct paths of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence notwithstanding, the cases intersect at one logical
juncture: a general reassessment of the principles that formerly were
the anchors of a fairly well-settled, albeit controversial, area of the
law. The realignment is at least a complete repudiation, if not a de
facto overruling, of the guiding89precepts of the Court's landmark
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.1
The change is best viewed in a comparison between Chief Justice
Burger's point of departure in Lemon and the language employed in
the opinion of Justices Kennedy and Scalia in Rosenberger III and
Capitol Square III, respectively. In Lemon, Burger stated:
A law may be one 'respecting' the forbidden objective while
falling short of its total realization. A law 'respecting' the
proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not
always easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given
law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one
'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could lead
90
to such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.
188. See supra Parts II.C, III.C.
189. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

See supra notes 3, 62-68 and accompanying text for a

discussion of the Lemon test.
190. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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In contrast, Justice Kennedy's commencement of Establishment
Clause analysis of the University policy in Rosenberger III appeared
markedly less concerned with former Chief Justice Burger's
distinctions. Kennedy noted:
A central lesson in our decisions is that a significant factor in
upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion. We have
decided a series of cases addressing the receipt of government
benefits 9where religion or religious views are implicated in some
degree. 1 1
The first case Kennedy highlights in the First Amendment
Establishment Clause decisions "series" is, of course, Everson v.
Board of Education,192 which permits a school district to provide
transportation to children in a private school.' 93 However, the
Kennedy opinion in Rosenberger III subsequently makes a
conspicuous jump over the Lemon line of cases directly to Lamb's
Chapel v. CenterMoriches Union Free School District94 and Widmar
v. Vincent,' 95 which are regarded as dealing merely with the question
of access of religious viewpoints to certain speech fora. If
RosenbergerIII is considered under this paradigm, the Establishment
Clause tests set forth by Lemon and its progeny are not only neglected
by the Court, they are made completely irrelevant. Thus, as the Court
noted, Rosenberger III is reduced to a consideration of whether the
University's regulation is prohibited "viewpoint discrimination." Just
as Justice Kennedy's opinion in Rosenberger III evades Lemon's
excessive entanglement test, Scalia's dismissive treatment of the
endorsement test in Capitol Square III indicates a disregard of the
principles inherent in Lemon.
By its terms that [Establishment] Clause applies only to the
words and acts of government. It was never meant, and has
never been read by this Court, to serve as an impediment to
purely private religious speech connected
196 to the State only
through its occurrence in a public forum.
Justice Scalia's statement, notwithstanding the certainty with which
it is delivered, is directly contradicted in Lemon, which was not
overruled. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, in its discussion of the
dangers inherent in government entanglement in the acts and words of
191. Rosenberger II1, 115 S. Ct. at 2521.
192. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
193. Id. at 17.
194. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
195. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
196. Capitol Square I1, 115 S. Ct. at 2449.
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private citizens, notes that "[w]e cannot ignore the danger that a teacher
under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the
97
religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college education."'
Justice Kennedy's perspective likewise ignores the cumulative
danger of programs benefiting religion, despite their apparent
neutrality. Chief Justice Burger's analysis clearly did not consider
neutrality the dispositive element of the Court's analysis. "The
potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and
practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for
continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger
demands ...."'98
Justice Scalia's emphasis in Capitol Square III on governmental
neutrality 9 9 is perhaps the clearest indication of how the Court will
deal with speech cases that raise Establishment Clause issues. It
appears that so long as there is no disparate treatment among religious
groups, the Court will look only to free expression principles to
determine whether governmental regulation is proper. Furthermore, it
is unclear whether a state's interest in complying with the
Establishment Clause will ever be deemed "compelling" enough to
sustain regulation.
The Court's new view of the Establishment Clause simultaneously
rendered Chief Justice Burger's statements in Lemon both prophetic
and obsolete. The proliferation of religious expression in arenas that
were once primarily secular has brought the Establishment Clause into
the uncertain realm of late twentieth century American politics. Yet,
while the deconstruction of Establishment Clause jurisprudence may
not have been envisioned by Chief Justice Burger and his colleagues in
1971, the implications of such actions were quietly acknowledged.
"As well as constituting an independent evil against which the Religion
Clauses were intended to protect, involvement or entanglement
between government and religion serves as a warning signal." 2°°
In the wake of Mergens,2 °' the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 20 2 which restored the judicially created "compelling interest" test
197. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
198. Id. at 623.
199. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
Scalia's opinion.
200. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25.
201. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that a school which
denied a student's request to form a religious group violated the Equal Access Act). See
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b to bb-4 (1994). See supra note 168 (discussing RFRA). The
constitutionality of RFRA is before the Court in Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352
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that the government must meet when it presumes to constrain one's
right of free exercise of religion, was signed into law by President
Clinton in November 1993. In Lamb's Chapel,20 3 a unanimous
Supreme Court further obfuscated the appropriate place of religious
activity in the public arena when it held that a school policy which
permitted public school property to be used to present all but religious
viewpoints was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.2 °4
Adding fuel to the fire is Justice Souter's observation in his dissent
in Rosenberger III that the Court "for the first time, approves direct
funding of core religious activities by an arm of the State. '0 5 In fact,
one could just as readily argue that RosenbergerIII is an extension of
the revived "child benefit" test that emerged in Mueller, Witters, and
Zorbest, because the dissent's argument that all three of these cases
involved a "third party" standing between the government and the
ultimate beneficiary 2 6 does not withstand closer scrutiny. In all three
of those cases it is arguable whether beneficiaries were religious
institutions, or whether the so-called child benefit test is still
applicable, especially when an adult student, as in Witters, is involved.
The effect of RosenbergerIII is that when a public university offers
funds, directly or indirectly, for any student paper, pamphlet, or
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). The Fifth Circuit held that RFRA
did not violate the Establishment Clause, where a city Landmark Commission denied a
parish's appeal for a variance that would have allowed it to enlarge a church that was
located in an historic district. Id. Compare Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1557
(8th Cir. 1996) (McMillan, J., dissenting) (concluding that RFRA is unconstitutional),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (1996).
For a discussion of the status of RFRA in light of the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Flores, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Flores v. City of Boerne: Testing the
Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 115 EDUC. L. REP. 593
(1997). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1994) (stating
that the RFRA violates principles of religious freedom, goes beyond limitations of
legitimate federal authority, and manipulates the judiciary's interpretation of the
Constitution).
203. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
204. Lamb's Chapel was preceded by three cases, all of which ruled in favor of nonschool religious groups that sought equal access to public school facilities. See Travis
v. Owego-Appalachian Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1991); Gregorie v. Centennial
Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990) (enjoining school board from denying access
to school auditorium in the first post-Mergens case to rely on the Equal Access Act, 20
U.S.C. § 4071); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1988) (upholding preliminary injunction). It is important to note that in both
Gregorie and Travis, the religious groups had other facilities available. In Deeper Life,
the religious group sought to use public school facilities temporarily because its church
had been destroyed by fire.
205. Rosenberger !i, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2544 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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magazine, religiously-affiliated students at the public university now
have constitutional rights under the First Amendment to public funding
in order to utilize such public school, taxpayer-supported media to pay
and to proselytize in print. Ultimately, whether this is acceptable or is
unconstitutional establishment of religion is debatable. Yet, if one
agrees with Justice O'Connor's concurring reasoning, it merely puts
all groups on an equal footing.
Indeed, President Clinton, a Yale Law School graduate and a former
professor of constitutional law at the University of Arkansas Law
School, in a major policy address on July 12, 1995, in the immediate
wake of Rosenberger III, eloquently defended the constitutional and
proper place of religion in public schools. The President declared:
[N]othing in the First Amendment converts our public schools
into religion-free zones or requires all religious expression to be
left behind at the schoolhouse door. While the government may
not use schools to coerce the conscience of our students or to
convey official endorsement of religion, the [public] schools
also may not discriminate against private religious expression
during the school day.
Religion is too important in our history and our heritage for us
to keep it out of our schools. . . . [I]t shouldn't be demanded,
but as long as it is not sponsored by school officials and doesn't
20 7
interfere with other children's rights, it mustn't be denied.
President Clinton vigorously reaffirmed the First Amendment free
exercise rights and principles forcefully enunciated by the Court in
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger III, and supported by the Equal
Access Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The
President's July 12, 1995, memorandum to Attorney General Reno
and Secretary of Education Riley most directly addressed the free
exercise rights at stake in Rosenberger 111.208 President Clinton's
memorandum states, in pertinent part:
Religious literature: Students have a right to distribute religious
literature to their schoolmates on the same terms as they are
permitted to distribute to their schoolmates other literature that
is unrelated to school curriculum or activities. Schools may
impose the same reasonable time, place, and manner or other
207. Letter from Richard W. Riley, United States Secretary of Education, to public
school superintendents (Aug. 10, 1995) (quoting address of President Clinton, July 12,
1995) (on file with authors).
208. For partial text of the President's Memorandum on Religious Expression in
Public Schools, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1227 (July 12, 1995) [hereinafter
President's Memorandum], and full text of the Secretary of Education's letter, see the
Appendix at the end of this Essay.
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constitutional restrictions on distribution of religious literature
as they do on nonschool literature generally, but 209
they may not
single out religious literature for special regulation.

The principles expressed by the Court in Rosenberger III will
certainly flourish in this broader and very hospitable political and
social cultural climate. However, there has been a very problematic
and unprecedented melding of First Amendment speech expression
and religion (establishment/free exercise) jurisprudence, via the
Rosenberger III and CapitolSquare III decisions. Religious symbols,
like the cross, and substances likewise have been confusingly merged
by the Court, without regard to whether the religious symbol and
substance is wholly perverted by the pernicious motives of the
particular entity-most notably for the purposes of this Essay the
Klan-sponsoring the display of the symbol.
The Court's content neutrality-and deep aversion to censorshiphas now unwittingly fostered the insidious use of religious symbol by
those most antithetical to the religious tenets exemplified by the
symbol. While Justice Scalia astutely criticizes the bizarre
subordination of religious expression to a constitutional status less
protected than non-obscene pornography, no Justice, including Scalia,
is sensitive to the pernicious ramifications of the Klan's use of the
cross. 10 The shame of it is that none of the Justices has yet
209. President's Memorandum, supra note 208, at 1228.
210. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), represents the Supreme Court's
modem criteria for whether pornographic material is considered obscene and thus subject
to regulation under the states' police power. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
explained that the First Amendment would not protect material if: (1) the "average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find the work appeals to
the prurient interest; (2) "the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;" and (3) the work "lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. The Court's three-part
definition of obscene material is most significant for its enunciation of the "community
standards" doctrine in the first prong of the definition. The Court noted that the
applicable community standard ought to be local, in light of the "futility" of attempting
to construct national community standards. Id. at 30. Despite its significance, the
"contemporary community standards" doctrine has led to some confusing results. In
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), Justice Powell attempted to define how a
state may set boundaries for a jury's consideration of community standards,
notwithstanding the fact that direct legislation setting such boundaries was prohibited.
Id. at 302-03. Furthermore, the Smith decision implied that a jury sitting in a federal or
state prosecution might properly be directed to apply the national community standard
declared futile in Miller. Id. at 312. However, the Court recently repudiated an attack on
a federal statute regulating obscene telephone recordings as attempting to create a
national standard of obscenity. In Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989), Justice White explained that the federal statute was in no way inconsistent with
Miller (it did not create a national standard) and that materials covered by the law may be
subjected to the varying community standards of the judicial districts in which actions
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confronted the potentially radical consequences of the Court's
continuing confusion of the First Amendment's free expression and
Religion Clauses jurisprudence.
V.

APPENDIX

On August 10, 1995, the United States Secretary of Education,
Richard W. Riley, sent to each public school superintendent in the
United States a "statement of principles addressing the extent to which
religious expression and activity are permitted in our public
schools. 22 ' Secretary Riley's August 10, 1995 letter and the Clinton
administration's "Statement of Principles" follow:
Dear Superintendent:
On July 12th, President Clinton directed the Secretary of Education,
in consultation with the Attorney General, to provide every school
district in America with a statement of principles addressing the extent
to which religious expression and activity are permitted in our public
schools. In response to the President's request, I am sending -to you
this statement of principles.
In the last two years, I have visited with many educators, parents,
students, and religious leaders. I have become increasingly aware of
the real need to find a new common ground in the growing and, at
are commenced. Id. at 125-26.
The increasing confusion surrounding the contemporary community standards test is
further highlighted by recent cases involving commercial on-line transmissions of a
sexually explicit nature. In United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996), the Sixth Circuit soundly rejected the premise that because
the transmission took place in "cyberspace" the court was forced to adopt a new
definition of "community." Id. at 711-12. Cf. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406
(C.A.A.F. 1996) (military court's community, for purposes of determining if on-line
material was obscene, was properly "Air Force-wide").
Perhaps the confusion regarding the Miller test led the Court to consider other means
of analyzing questions of whether obscene expressions enjoy First Amendment
protection. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), Chief Justice
Rehnquist employed the test elucidated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), to find that a state's regulation of the non-speech element of nude dancing (that
incidentally infringed upon the arguably protected erotic message element of the
dancing) was justified because it furthered an important governmental interest-the
"disapproval of nudity in public places." Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571-72. See also Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (upholding
pornography and indecency on cable access channels, and striking down attempts to
regulate cable access indecent materials); American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (analyzing Communications Decency Act regulation of
Internet pornography as unconstitutional).
2 I. Letter from Richard W. Riley, United States Secretary of Education, to public
school superintendents (Aug. 10, 1995) (quoting address of President Clinton, July 12,
1995) (on file with authors).
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times, divisive debate about religion in our public schools. President
Clinton and I hope that this information will provide useful guidance to
educators, parents, and students in defining the proper place for
religious expression and religious freedom in our public schools.
As the President explained, the First Amendment imposes two basic
and equally important obligations on public school officials in their
dealings with religion. First, schools may not forbid students acting
on their own from expressing their personal religious views or beliefs
solely because they are of a religious nature. Schools may not
discriminate against private religious expression by students, but must
instead give students the same right to engage in religious activity and
discussion as they have to engage in other comparable activity.
Generally, this means that students may pray in a non-disruptive
manner during the school day when they are not engaged in school
activities and instruction, subject to the same rules of order as apply to
other student speech.
At the same time, schools may not endorse religious activity or
doctrine, nor may they coerce participation in religious activity.
Among other things, of course, school administrators and teachers
may not organize or encourage prayer exercises in the classroom. And
the right of religious expression in school does not include the right to
have a "captive audience" listen, or to compel other students to
participate. School officials should not permit student religious speech
to turn into religious harassment aimed at a student or a small group of
students. Students do not have the right to make repeated invitations
to other students to participate in religious activity in the face of a
request to stop.
The statement of principles set forth below derives from the First
Amendment. Implementation of these principles, of course, will
depend on specific factual contexts and will require careful
consideration in particular cases.
Although most schools have been implementing these principles
already, some problems have arisen where people are unaware of, or
do not understand, these obligations. It is my sincere hope that these
principles will help to end much of the confusion regarding religious
expression in public schools and that they can provide a basis for
school officials, teachers, parents, and students to work together to
find common ground-helping us to get on with the important work of
education. I want to recognize again the efforts of religious and other
civic groups who came together earlier this year to issue a statement of
current law on religion in the public schools, from which we drew
heavily in developing these principles.
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I encourage you to share this information widely and in the most
appropriate manner with your school community. Accept my sincere
thanks for your continuing work on behalf of all of America's
children.
Sincerely,
Richard W. Riley
U.S. Secretary of Education
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Student prayer and religious discussion: The Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment does not prohibit purely private religious
speech by students. Students therefore have the same right to engage
in individual or group prayer and religious discussion during the
school day as they do to engage in other comparable activity. For
example, students may read their Bibles or other scriptures, say grace
before meals, and pray before tests to the same extent they may engage
in comparable non-disruptive activities. Local school authorities
possess substantial discretion to impose rules of order and other
pedagogical restrictions on student activities, but they may not
structure or administer such rules to discriminate against religious
activity or speech.
Generally, students may pray in a nondisruptive manner when not
engaged in school activities or instruction, and subject to the rules that
normally pertain in the applicable setting. Specifically, students in
informal settings, such as cafeterias and hallways, may pray and
discuss their religious views with each other, subject to the same rules
of order as apply to other student activities and speech. Students may
also speak to, and attempt to persuade, their peers about religious
topics just as they do with regard to political topics. School officials,
however, should intercede to stop student speech that constitutes
harassment aimed at a student or a group of students.
Students may also participate in before or after school events with
religious content, such as "see you at the flag pole" gatherings, on the
same terms as they may participate in other noncurriculum activities on
school premises. School officials may neither discourage nor
encourage participation in such an event.
The right to engage in voluntary prayer or religious discussion free
from discrimination does not include the right to have a captive
audience listen, or to compel other students to participate. Teachers
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and school administrators should ensure that no student is in any way
coerced to participate in religious activity.
Graduation prayer and baccalaureates: Under current Supreme
Court decisions, school officials may not mandate or organize prayer
at graduation, nor organize religious baccalaureate ceremonies. If a
school generally opens its facilities to private groups, it must make its
facilities available on the same terms to organizers of privately
sponsored religious baccalaureate services. A school may not extend
preferential treatment to baccalaureate ceremonies and may in some
instances be obliged to disclaim official endorsement of such
ceremonies.
Official neutrality regarding religious activity: Teachers and school
administrators, when acting in those capacities, are representatives of
the state and are prohibited by the establishment clause from soliciting
or encouraging religious activity, and from participating in such
activity with students. Teachers and administrators also are prohibited
from discouraging activity because of its religious content, and from
soliciting or encouraging antireligious activity.
Teaching about religion: Public schools may not provide religious
instruction, but they may teach about religion, including the Bible or
other scripture: the history of religion, comparative religion, the Bible
(or other scripture)-as-literature, and the role of religion in the history
of the United States and other countries all are permissible public
school subjects. Similarly, it is permissible to consider religious
influences on art, music, literature, and social studies. Although
public schools may teach about religious holidays, including their
religious aspects, and may celebrate the secular aspects of holidays,
schools may not observe holidays as religious events or promote such
observance by students.
Student assignments: Students may express their beliefs about
religion in the form of homework, artwork, and other written and oral
assignments free of discrimination based on the religious content of
their submissions. Such home and classroom work should be judged
by ordinary academic standards of substance and relevance, and
against other legitimate pedagogical concerns identified by the school.
Religious literature: Students have a right to distribute religious
literature to their schoolmates on the same terms as they are permitted
to distribute other literature that is unrelated to school curriculum or
activities. Schools may impose the same reasonable time, place, and
manner or other constitutional restrictions on distribution of religious
literature as they do on nonschool literature generally, but they may not
single out religious literature for special regulation.
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Religious excusals: Subject to applicable State laws, schools enjoy
substantial discretion to excuse individual students from lessons that
are objectionable to the student or the students' parents on religious or
other conscientious grounds. School officials may neither encourage
nor discourage students from availing themselves of an excusal option.
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, if it is proved that
particular lessons substantially burden a student's free exercise of
religion and if the school cannot prove a compelling interest in
requiring attendance, the school would be legally required to excuse
the student.
Released time: Subject to applicable State laws, schools have the
discretion to dismiss students to off-premises religious instruction,
provided that schools do not encourage or discourage participation or
penalize those who do not attend. Schools may not allow religious
instruction by outsiders on school premises during the school day.
Teaching values: Though schools must be neutral with respect to
religion, they may play an active role with respect to teaching civic
values and virtue, and the moral code that holds us together as a
community. The fact that some of these values are held also by
religions does not make it unlawful to teach them in school.
Student garb: Students may display religious messages on items of
clothing to the same extent that they are permitted to display other
comparable messages. Religious messages may not be singled out for
suppression, but rather are subject to the same rules as generally apply
to comparable messages. When wearing particular attire, such as
yarmulkes and head scarves, during the school day is part of students'
religious practice, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
schools generally may not prohibit the wearing of such items.
THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT
The Equal Access Act is designed to ensure that, consistent with the
First Amendment, student religious activities are accorded the same
access to public school facilities as are student secular activities.
Based on decisions of the Federal courts, as well as its interpretations
of the Act, the Department of Justice has advised that the Act should be
interpreted as providing, among other things, that:
General provisions: Student religious groups at public secondary
schools have the same right of access to school facilities as is enjoyed
by other comparable student groups. Under the Equal Access Act, a
school receiving Federal funds that allows one or more student
noncurriculum-related clubs to meet on its premises during
noninstructional time may not refuse access to student religious
groups.
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Prayer services and worship exercises covered: A meeting, as
defined and protected by the Equal Access Act, may include a prayer
service, Bible reading, or other worship exercise.
Equal access to means of publicizing meetings: A school receiving
Federal funds must allow student groups meeting under the Act to use
the school media-including the public address system, the school
newspaper, and the school bulletin board-to announce their meetings
on the same terms as other noncurriculum-related student groups are
allowed to use the school media. Any policy concerning the use of
school media must be applied to all noncurriculum-related student
groups in a nondiscriminatory manner. Schools, however, may
inform students that certain groups are not school sponsored.
Lunch-time and recess covered: A school creates a limited open
forum under the Equal Access Act, triggering equal access rights for
religious groups, when it allows students to meet during their lunch
periods or other noninstructional time during the school day, as well as
when it allows students to meet before and after the school day.

